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Loss of Control on Landing 
FORUM 
LOSS OF CONTROL ONLANDING: U Z  NEED TO CHANGE OUR MINDSET 
A SER-LEARNING PROJECT FOR FLIGHTSAFETY 
Ed Randel, Guillaume Le Couteulx, & Jitesh Bahl 
ABSTRACT 
The accident of FedEx Flight 14 was caused by something that pilots do with alarming frequency, flying an 
unstable approach. This is a large problem in general aviation, and after reading this analysis it will be apparent that 
the only way to recover fiom an unstable approach is to go around. This analysis begins with a description of loss of 
control on landing and shows how common it is. The details of FedEx Flight 14 are then discussed in length, as well 
as some of the training and procedures at Federal Express. Then, aviation safety tools, such as the 5-M Model, are 
applied to the accident to uncover some of the root causes, as opposed to the apparent causes provided by the NTSB. 
Finally, the action that has been taken locally in the Daytona Beach, FL area will be discussed. This action includes 
a safety seminar which was held on Embry-Riddle's campus, as well as an article that was published in the campus 
newspaper. 
INTRODUCTION 
The pilots of FedEx Flight 14, which crashed at Newark 
international Airport on July 31, 1997, succumbed to 
something that many pilots do on a daily basis, shooting an 
unstable approach. Every pilot has shot an unstable 
approach at some point in their time flying, but it does not 
always end up causing an accident. Many times during 
training a pilot will initiate a go-around, a maneuver in 
which he or she adds power and climbs out to try the 
approach again, but too often the person does not realize 
why they should do it. The most important thing for a 
student, or any pilot for that matter, to know is why there 
was a need for a go-around. If the Captain of FedEx 14 had 
been able to recognize that his approach had become 
unstable, this accident could have been avoided. Obviously 
there were many other factors that were associated with this 
accident that will be discussed in this analysis, but that fact 
still holds true. 
This analysis of the FedEx Flight 14 accident will 
discuss the topic of loss of control on landing, explain how 
commonplace it is today and why it is an important issue to 
try to correct. Following that will be an overview of the 
accident, including the official cause stated by the NTSB, as 
well as what was determined to be the root causes. The data 
and information gathered fiom the official accident report 
will then be related to the topic of loss of control on landing. 
After providing a thorough explanation of the accident and 
its root causes, the action that this team has taken locally to 
help mitigate loss of control on landing accidents will be 
discussed as an example of student service-learning tied to 
an academic course. After that is a discussion of some 
common aviation safety tools and how they can be 
implemented while researching accidents such as FedEx 
Flight 14. Finally, a discussion ensues on what can be done 
by safety activists all around the country to help prevent 
accidents involving loss of control on landing h m  
occurring will be portrayed. 
LOSS OF CONTROL ON LANDING 
Many people are aware of the saying "landings are where 
pilots earn their money", and some pilots may have even 
been told this. This saying makes sense because when an 
average person goes flying, it is common for them to base 
their pilots' skill level mainly on the landing. Who has not 
been on a commercial flight where somebody has cracked 
a joke about getting the 'hew guy" because the landing was 
not as smooth as others they have had before? As it pertains 
to the aviation industry, mainly pilots, this saying holds true 
as well because of how much can go wrong while the 
aircraft is close to the ground. For this reason, it is very 
important for a pilot to understand the factors that will lead 
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to a stabilized approach and safe landing. FedEx Flight 14, 
which crashed at Newark International Airport on July 3 1, 
1997, demonstrated what can happen when an aircraft does 
not make a stabilized approach to the runway. The details of 
the accident will be discussed in detail in the next section, 
but it is necessary to mention that it is classified as a loss of 
control on landing accident. 
The easiest way to define many things is to break them 
up into smaller parts, which is how loss of control on 
landing will be discussed. The titst part of the phrase, ''Loss 
of control ...," can be defined as any time that the pilot's 
control inputs, desired aircraft reaction, and the actual 
aircraft reaction are not in sync with one another. This can 
hold true for both over-controllii as was the case in the 
FedEx Flight 14 accident, as well as under-controlling the 
aircraft. Over-control of the aircraft is more commonly seen, 
which generally leads to a condition called Pilot Induced 
Oscillation (PIO), which is when a pilot tries to correct for 
their previous input with a larger input in the opposite 
direction. The aircraft then continues to diverge from the 
desired flight path until it cannot be controlled. 
The second half of the phrase, ". ..on landing," can 
be more misleading then it may appear at first glance. This 
does not only pertain to the act of landing the aircraft on the 
runway sudke, but begins well before a flight ever gets to 
the landing phase. The first thing that can factor into the 
landing is the quality of the approach brief&. Approach 
briefings should include enough information so the pilot, or 
crew in larger operations, has a clear picture of the airport, 
its surroundings, and what procedures will be used for the 
approach and landing. If any part of this is not clear, it can 
lead to an unstabilized approach. The next phase of flight 
that factors into the landing is the approach to the runway, 
which must be stabilized by an altitude set forth by the 
specific operator. An appropriate altitude to be stabilized by 
for general aviation air& is SO0 feet. What does it mean 
to be stabilized? The Flight Safety Foundation states that for 
an approach to be stabilized, the aircraft must be: configured 
for landing, on glide slope, within a specific tolerance of the 
approach speed, able to continue to the runway wit! 
minimal pitch and power adjustments, and have a minimal 
sink rate (Stabilized Approach, 2000). After completing a 
comprehensive briefing and flying a stabilized approach, the 
pilot is more adequately prepared to safely and skillhlly 
land the aircraft. 
Although the approach and landing only accounts 
for a small percentage of the total flight time, a large 
number of accidents occur during this time. A study was 
completed for the time period between 1984 and 1997 and 
it was determined that out of 76 loss of control on landing 
accidents, 66 percent of them were caused by unstable 
approaches (Stabilized Approach, 2000). Figure 1 is a chart 
published by the Flight Safety Foundation that shows the 
leading causes of landing accidents. Unfortunately this type 
of accident is much more prevalent then is desired and can 
involve pilots of any skill level. 
Landina Gear Malfunction 
" 
5.6% 
Surface Conditions I Aircraft Configuration 
Figure 1. Leadiig Landing Accident Causes (Stabilized Approach, 2000). 
- 
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The next section of this analysis will summarize the flight as 
well as a discussion of the flight characteristics. It is 
important to keep in mind all of the factors associated with 
loss of control on landing and how it can be avoided. 
SUMMARY OF IXIGHT 
On July 31" 1997, at Newark International Airport, 
approximately 0132 eastern daylight time, Federal Express 
Flight 14 crashed while attempting to land on Runway 22R, 
which has a length of 8,200 feet. Five occupants were on 
board and only minor injuries were received. Their flight 
began in Singapore on July 30m, 1997 and was due to 
terminate at Newark International Airport on July 3 I\ with 
stops in Penang, Malaysia; Taipei, Taiwan; and Anchorage, 
Alaska. 
Onboard were the Captain and First Officer, two cabin 
passengers, and one jump seat passenger. The Captain and 
First Ofl5cer had taken over the final leg of the flight, from 
Anchorage to Newark. All of the previous landings at the 
scheduled stops were performed safely. According to the 
flight plan, the aircraft flew at 33,000 feet, FL 330, with an 
estimated time enroute of 5 hours and 51 minutes from 
Anchorage to Newark. It was also noted that the aircraft's 
No.1 thrust reverser, located on the left engine, was 
inoperative and that the crew was aware of it. 
At Newark, visual meteorological condition prevailed 
with winds b m  240" at 10 knots, 10 statue miles of 
visibility and clouds scattered at 8000 feet. As the aircraft 
approached final, the Captain, who was flying, disengaged 
the autopilot and flew the a h a f t  to touchdown. As he 
flared the aircraft for touchdown, he lost control of the 
aircraft suddenly, and impacted the runway, went airborne, 
and then touched down for the second time with extreme 
force, followed by the collapse of the right main landing 
gear. The aircraft came to a rest with the fuselage inverted, 
and parts scattered on and to the right of the runway. 
What happened in this accident? Was this simply flight 
crew error, or was there more behind the accident? 
Throughout the following section, the pilot's personal 
information, the a i r d  and crew's performance during the 
approach and landing sequence, the Federal Express trainiig 
program and finally the cause of the accident, shall be 
discussed. 
Crew Flight History 
The 46 year old captain was hired by the Flying Tigers in 
1979, and became a FedEx pilot in 1989. He held an airline 
transport pilot (ATP) certificate as well as a type rating in 
the MD- 1 1. He received his FAA k t  class medical 
certificate on April 15", 1997 and was issued a limitation to 
wear corrective lenses. His last proficiency check and line 
check before the accident were on April 15", 1997 and July 
JAAER, Spring 2008 
1 I", 1997 respectively. The captain had a total of 1 1,000 
hours; 2,62 1 of which were with Federal Express. He logged 
1,253 hours in the MD-11 and had a total of 31 8 hours as 
pilot in command of that aircraft. The records also stated 
that he had hiled an upgrade proficiency check ride on 
October 29*, 1996, but then passed after receiving 
additional training. He also completed the MD-11 Tail 
Strike Awareness Training Program twice, once for 
recurrent training as a first officer on July lo", 1996 and the 
second time during his captain upgrade training on 
November ISm, 1996. 
The captain arrived in Anchorage, Alaska the day before 
the accident from Nevada and stated that he was in good 
health, received adequate rest, and had no signs of fatigue. 
He stated that he felt tired at the end of the accident flight 
but his performance was not affected. 
The 39 year old first officer was hired on September 6", 
1994 as a ground service employee and was then transferred 
to the air operations division in October, 1995. Prior to 
starting with the company, he was a pilot in the U.S. Navy 
and a flight engineer for another airline. He had logged a 
total of 1,911 hours of flight time as a pilot and 1,200 hours 
as a flight engineer. He held both ATP and flight engineer 
certificates and was type rated in the MD-11. His last FAA 
medical certificate was issued on March 25", 1997 and had 
received no limitations. His latest proficiency check and line 
check were on May 18" 1997 and June 28", 1997. 
Prior to the accident, he had logged 3,703 hours of total 
time, 592 of which were with FedEx and 95 hours were on 
the MD-11. Records stated that he had also completed the 
MD- 1 1 Tail Strike Awareness Training Program on May dm 
and lo", 1997. The first officer had been off duty for 2 days 
in Anchorage and he stated that he had 8 hours of rest the 
day before the accident and did not feel fatigued at any time 
during the flight. If it was not crew fatigue, what actually led 
to the accident? Next, the aircraft and crew's performance 
must be analyzed. 
Aircraft & Crew Performance 
During the final approach segment, the aircraft was 
stabilized for much of the approach to Runway 22R at 
Newark. At 1,200 feet the captain disengaged the auto pilot, 
left the auto throttles engaged, and hand flew the aircraft to 
touchdown. With the auto throttles engaged, the throttles are 
automatically reduced to idle thrust, when the aimaft 
descends through 50 feet of altitude. According to the flight 
data recorder, the aircraft maintained an airspeed of 158 
knots, with flaps set to 50', and the landing gear deployed. 
The aircraft had a vertical speed of 800 feet per minute, a 2" 
to 3" pitch up attitude, and the throttles set between 55' to 
58' thrust resolver angle (TRA). The TRA corresponds to 
- -  - 
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the total travel of the throttles, with 4 1 ' being idle thrust and 
85' nearing full thrust. 
As the captain initiated the flare at 38 feet, the aircraft's 
pitch increased to 4 9 ,  while the thrust and airspeed 
decreased, and the vertical acceleration increased to 1.18 
G's. As the aircraft passed through 17 feet, the captain 
pitched the nose down causing vertical acceleration to 
decrease to 0.93 G's while descending through 7 feet. 
Suddenly, the captain increased thrust, pitched the nose up, 
applied left rudder deflection along with a right wing down 
aileron deflection, and touched down 1,126 feet beyond the 
runway threshold. Then the aircrafi went airborne. Half a 
second later the captain reduced power and pitched the nose 
back down while applying more left rudder and right wing 
aileron deflection. The aircraft impacted the runway for the 
second time 1,889 feet beyond the runway threshold, at 1.70 
G's, causing the right main landing gear to collapse. 
Following that, the aircraft ruptured; resulting in wreckage 
being scattered, 5,126 feet beyond the threshold and 580 feet 
to the right of the centerline, with the fuselage coming to 
rest inverted slightly to the right of the runway. 
Figure 2. Aircraft Debris Analysis (NTSB, 2000). 
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Despite the instability of the final portions of approach, the 
crew did not execute a go-around. Before determining the 
root causes of this accident, some of the training programs 
which the crew had received, specifically for the MD-11, 
warrant attention. 
FedEx MD-11 Tail Strike Awareness Training 
Program 
The purpose of this program, which began in June 1996, 
was to increase awareness of tail strikes which commonly 
occur on the MD-11, as well as to show how to prevent 
them. The program focuses on how to maintain a proper 
sink rate, recover fiom a bounce, and other low level ground 
techniques. This program stated that "25 percent of MD-11 
tail strikes to date have occurred on takeoff and 75 percent 
on landing." Generally, tail strikes occur on landing when 
i%e aircraft's flaps are configured to 35" and 50', but can 
idso occur when the center of gravity is either too far 
f'>rward or afi, the aircraft is very light or heavy, and by 
h,iving over serviced struts. The instructor's guide for this 
piogram states that if an unstable approach or bounce 
occurs, a go-around should be initiated. Pilots tend to 
attempt to decrease a high sink rate during an approach, by 
increasing the pitch attitude. This actually increases the 
effective weight of the aircraft and the vertical acceleration, 
which will then compress the main gears even m e r ,  thus 
causing the aft fbselage to strike the runway. The program 
also notes that pilots should avoid holding the "aircraft off 
in an attempt to achieve a smooth landing." Holding the 
aircraft off of the runway will result in a longer touchdown, 
increase in braking, and a higher pitch attitude which can 
cause a tail strike (NTSB, 2000). 
So how do pilots perform a normal landing in the MD- 
1 l?  The procedure states that pilots should aim to touch 
down 1,500 feet beyond the runway threshold. At 30 feet of 
altitude, pilots should initiate a2.5" flare attitude, which will 
transition the aircraft into the landing attitude. By this time, 
the aircraft will be below 10 feet and the pilot should 
maintain a constant attitude by releasing some of the 
elevator back pressure. In this accident, however, the 
Captain did not follow this procedure. Even having taken 
the training program, the Captain was still unable to land the 
Loss of Control on Landing 
aircraft safely. In August, 1997, FedEx implemented a 25 
minute video to reinforce the tail strike awareness and go- 
around techniques. 
Cause of accident 
The NTSB concluded that "the captain's over control of 
the elevator during the landing and his failure to execute a 
go-around fiom a destabilized flare were causal to the 
accident. Contributing to the accident was the captain's 
concern with touching down early to ensure adequate 
stopping distance." The captain's over control of the aircraft 
resulted in a classic case of pilot induced oscillation (PIO). 
In addition, the captain's landing procedure was inconsistent 
with the Federal Express MD-11 training program. 
Furthermore, the captain was concerned about the landing 
distance on the runway which was calculated by the Airport 
Performance Laptop Computer (APLC). The crew did not 
recognize the miscalculated stopping distance, causing the 
captain to feel the need to touch down earlier on the runway. 
\So how could an experienced crew miscalculate the 
stopping distance? Analytical tools such as the 5-M model 
and the Reason Model can be applied to the accident 
information to determine root causes. 
FLIGHT SAFETY CONCEPTS 
The history of flight safety and accident investigation has 
been punctuated by the appearance or the application of 
concepts such as the Five-M Model, introduced after World 
War I, the Reason Model, which appeared in the 1990's and 
also the Seven Human Factors which can affect pilot 
performance. Analyzing an accident is directly linked to the 
use of those concepts to help investigators and safety 
activists better understand an accident and determine all of 
the key elements that led to it. The following paragraphs 
show how the three previously mentioned concepts can be 
applied to the FedEx Flight 14 accident. 
The 5-M Model applied to the Fed& Flight 14 
accident 
The 5-M Model helps to better understand what could 
have led to an accident (Wells & Rodrigues, 2003). It is 
divided into five parts: Man, Machine, Medium, Mission 
and Management, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The 5-M Model (Wells & Rodrigues, 2003). 
Those five M's, which are linked together, must comprise 
all the elements that may be analyzed in order to determine 
factors that can be considered causal in the accident. 
The first area of the 5-M Model that will be discussed is 
Man. In the FedEx Flight 14 accident, the captain's skills 
were relevant because he over-controlled the aircraft and 
experienced loss of control on landing. Moreover, the loss 
of control of the aircraft was induced by other elements such 
as the misinterpretation of the information given by the 
Airport Performance Laptop Computer (APLC), which led 
the crew to believe that Runway 22R was not going to be 
long enough. Concerned about the runway length, the 
captain wanted to touch down before the aiming points of 
the runway, which finally led to the loss of control of the 
aircraft. 
After looking into %e Man", it is important to look into 
the Machine aspect of the 5-M Model. Training sessions 
have been set up in the airline industry to help make pilots 
aware ofthe undesirable characteristics oftheMD-11. Some 
Page 18 
of these characteristics include: pitch up attitude when 
spoilers deploy at landing, which can lead to tail strikes, and 
"relaxed stability" caused by a CG further aft than the other 
civilian airplanes (Boser, 2002). All of these elements may 
have led the captain of FedEx Flight 14 to over-control the 
aircraft. As if those characteristics did not provide enough 
issues, on the day of the accident, a thrust reverser was 
inoperative. This led to the crew thbkhg that the landing 
distance was going to be longer than the one given by the 
APLC, but this is not the case because thrust reversers are 
not factored into the official landing distance requirement. 
MD-lls are also fitted with a F l i t  Control Computer 
(FCC) which dampers the orders sent to the flight controls. 
The intent is to "match the handling characteristics of the 
MD- 1 1 to those of the existing DC- 10 and the DC- 10 newly 
developed two-pilot adaptation, the MD- 10" (NTSB, 2000). 
The FCC design must be analyzed in order to determine the 
role it may have played in the accident. 
The third area that must be discussed is the Medium, 
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which has to do with the role the environment and time 
played in the accident. FedEx Flight 14 was due to arrive in 
Newark at night and visual meteorological conditions 
existed at the time of arrival. Runway 22R at Newark 
International Airport, and more importantly, its length, 
contributed to the crew being worried about the lading 
distance. This factor led to the crew's desire to touchdown 
early and contributed to the accident. 
Now that the man, machine, and medium have been 
discussed, the next area to look at is the mission. As was 
discussed earlier, FedEx Flight 14 was set to land inNewark 
after departing Singapore a day earlier and making three 
stops along the way. The goal of any flight is to safely 
execute all aspects of that flight and land safely at the 
destination. The crew, after having misinterpreted the 
information given by the APLC, decided that the only way 
to land safely was to touch down early. 
The Final section of the 5-M Model that needs to be 
discussed is the management. This section surrounds all of 
the other sections of the model and is very useful in wing 
to determine root causes. In this case, the training sessions 
used by FedEx may have contributed to the accident. The 
Crew did not appear to have adequate training using the 
APLC. In addition, the Captain and the First Officer both 
suffered fiom a lack of knowledge concerning the regulation 
pertaining to landing distance. They thought that the landing 
distance was going to be longer than the one given by the 
APLC because one thrust reverser was inoperative. In 
reality, the deceleration effects of the thrust reversers are not 
taken into account in determining the landing distance. 
Furthermore, the crew selected MAX auto brake, which 
automatically sets the deceleration rate a t  a value 
corresponding to the best fiiction coefficient, not depending 
on the use of thrust reversers. The possible inadequacies in 
training and deficiency in the knowledge of important 
Federal Regulations significantly contributed to the 
accident. 
m e  Reason's Model applied to the Fed& Flight 14 
A ccIdent 
The Reason Model is also known as the Swiss Cheese 
Model (Wells and Rodrigues, 2003). Each slice of the 
model represents a barrier that can prevent an accident h m  
happening. However, each slice is depicted with holes in it 
to represent errors or deficiencies in that particular area. For 
an accident to occur, those holes must all line up, which is 
shown in Figure 4. The first barrier depicted with holes in it 
is that of the decisions-makers. As stated before, the crew 
suffered fiom a lack of knowledge regarding the regulation 
concerning the calculation of landing distance. 
Preconditions 
Line Management Deficiencies 
r Decisions Makers 
Figure 4. The Reason Model (Wells & Rodrigues, 2003). 
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An important question to ask when usingthe Reasons Model 
is, what would have happened if FedEx or the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) had required written 
proficiency tests conceming commonly used regulations? 
When looking at the handling characteristics of the aircraft, 
what would have happened if the regulation concerning the 
certification of airplanes had been reviewed in order to 
increase the requirements concerning the stability of pitch 
movements? If these questions were addressed and action 
was taken to adjust current regulations, perhaps this type of 
accident could be avoided in the future. 
The next barrier is that of line management deficiencies, 
which pertains to the problems in the management of the 
company. It appeared that the crew suffered fiom 
insufficient training concerning landing techniques and the 
use of the APLC. The Captain of FedEx 14 did not adhere 
to the training proposed by FedEx, which shows a lack of 
training regarding adherence to standard operating 
procedures. 
Preconditions is the term used to describe the next barrier 
that is shown in the Reason Model, which encompasses 
ignorance of the system and the acceptance of hazards. The 
Crew misinterpreted the information given by the APLC and 
that misinterpretation was partly induced by a lack of 
knowledge of the regulation concerning landing distance 
calculation. For this reason, the captain thought it was worth 
the risk to the safety of the flight to attempt to land prior to 
the typical touchdown point. 
The fourth barrier, labeled unsafe acts, includes the use 
of wrong procedures and unsafe acts. The captain wanted 
to touch down early, but did not adhere to any of the 
procedures set forth by FedEx regarding landing the MD- 1 1. 
This led to the Pilot Induced Oscillations which finally led 
to the loss of control of the aircraft. In addition, the desire to 
touch down early altered the approach path of the aircraft 
and could have taken them outside of the object fiee area. 
Finally, the last barrier to an accident is termed defenses, 
which has to do with things such as safety regulations not 
being enforced or over-reliance on automation. The NTSB 
recommended upgrading the FCC, which highlighted some 
deficiencies in its conception, but this was being done 
slowly to not interrupt the flight schedules. In addition, the 
First Officer should have noticed the Captain's lack of 
control of the MD-11 and suggested a go-around. 
HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN FEDEX F'LIGHT 14 
There are seven factors which can alter the performance 
of a crew (Wells and Rodrigues, 2003). The first factor that 
&ts human performance is the physical factor, which 
includes things such as age, strength and the senses. The 
FedEx 14 captain suffered fiom sense and motor skill 
Page 20 
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deficiencies, leading him to overreact and lose control of the 
aircraft. Physiological factors take into account things such 
as health and nutrition. Even tho* htigue was not 
reported as a factor contributing to the accident, it is 
possible that the fatigue caused by a long flight could have 
factored into the misinterpretation of the information given 
by the APLC and knowledge of the regulation regarding that 
data. Psychological factors include the mental state and 
personality traits of the crew. This is important to consider 
because perhaps the captain thought he could land the 
aircraft without following procedures because he had done 
it before. This is known as normalization of deviance, a \ 
mentality of "it worked before, so it will work now". 
The psychosocial factors cover a wide range of effects, 
but most important in this case was anxiety and possibly 
their families. After a long flight, the will of landing as soon 
as possible may have urged the pilots to land even though 
the approach was not stabilized. In addition, the crew's 
skills may have been affected by the stress caused by the 
misinterpreted landing distance. Hardware factored into the 
accident because of the APLC interface and the FCC that 
was not upgraded. The APLC interface may have been 
deficient, increasing the risk of misinterpretation of the data. 
Nature of the task is another factor that must be considered 
when studying the accident. The crew was focused on 
touching down early and the inoperative thrust reverser was 
gaining much of the captain's attention. The captain 
reminded the first officer several times to only activate two 
thrust reversers. Finally, the environment may have 
contributed to the accident because it was nighttime when 
they landed at Newark. The darkness may have increased 
crew fatigue, which tends to decrease a crew's ability to 
function properly and safely. 
SERVICE-LEARNING TO PREVENT SIMILAR 
ACCIDENTS 
As mentioned previously, the FedEx Flight 14 accident 
was due in part to the loss of control, more specifically the 
over-control of the aircraft, by the captain during landing. 
This incidence was neither the first, nor the last time such an 
action led to an accident. Aside fiom the statistics given at 
the beginning of this report, that idea can be confirmed by 
reviewing the database provided by the Air Safety 
Foundation (Peterson, 2006). The database provides 
information on similar accidents, which will be discussed 
below. 
On December 21 1992, a Martinair DC-10 crashed at 
Faro, Portugal, killing 56 people. The instability of the 
approach was reported to be one of the contributing factors 
to the accident. One year later, in 1993, severe crosswinds 
in Dallas Fort Worth led to the destabilized approach of 
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American Airlines Fight 102. When the First Officer 
advised the Captain he was going to execute a go-around, 
the Captain took control of the DC-10 and decided to 
continue the approach and landing. The Captain failed "to 
use proper directional control techniques to maintain the 
aircraft on the runway" and the aircraft departed the runway 
(NTSB, 1994). In 1999, during a major thunderstorm, 3 
people were killed when an MD-11 crashed in Hong Kong. 
The final report stated that the Captain had failed to "to 
arrest the high rate of descent existing at 50 ft Radio 
Altitude" (Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, 2004). 
In those three cases, and other similar ones, the reports 
state loss of control as one of the causes that contributed to 
the accident. However, "Loss of Control on Landing" can 
be considered an apparent cause and can only be prevented 
by trying to fix the root causes which lie behind it. Many 
times these accidents are due to a lack of knowledge 
concerning unstabilized approaches and the necessity of 
going around. As written by Bahl, Le Couteulx and Randel, 
"the attitude must change fkom 'we will land unless'. . . , to 
a mindset of, 'let's be prepared to go around, and only land 
if the approach is stabilized and we can continue safely to 
the runway"' (The Avion, 2006). Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University is an excellent place to start 
teaching pilots how to recognize an unstabilized approach 
and to stress the need to perform a go-around fiom 
unstabilized approaches. Increased awareness of what can 
lead to the loss of control on landing is, in fact, the best way 
to prevent similar accidents fiom occurring. An article, titled 
We Need to Change our Mindset, which is the source of the 
previous quote, was published in the Avion on November 
14,2006, by the authors ofthis JAAERarticle. Additionally, 
a safety seminar titled Keys to Stabilized Approaches and 
Sqfe Landings was also organized and presented on 
November 27, 2006, at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University. A copy of the article fiom The Avion can be 
found in Appendix A. From those two safety actions, the 
key sentence to remember with regards to approach and 
landings could be: "Whenever you hesitate to go-around, go 
around!" 
CONCLUSION 
The FedEx Flight 14 accident resulted fiom an 
attempted landing following an unstable approach. The 
captain followed procedure and was flying a stabilized 
approach until an altitude of about 50 feet. After passing 
through this altitude, the captain controlled the aircraft in 
a way that led the aircraft into a pilot induced oscillation. 
Despite this, the crew did not execute a go-around, which 
is recommended by FedEx training and procedures for an 
unstable approach. To try to mitigate this type of accident 
in the future, it is important to look past the apparent 
cause, pilot error, and to divulge the root causes. Through 
the use of aviation safety tools such as the 5-M Model, the 
Reason Model, and the Seven Factors Affecting Human 
Performance, some of the possible root causes can be 
uncovered. The root causes included inadequacies in the 
training of the FedEx pilots, a deficiency of knowledge of 
pertinent regulations, which could tie into training, and 
the outdated Flight Control Computer that should have 
been updated prior to the accident. 
As was discussed earlier, this type of accident is very 
common in general aviation as well, which is why it is 
important to recognize an unstable approach and do the 
only appropriate thing, GO-AROUND! Hopefully this 
analysis has inspired pilots to have the courage to 
recognize their mistakes and simply go-around for another 
approach when circumstances dictate. + 
Ed Randel is a recent graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He is currently a flight instructor in Daytona 
Beach, FL and hopes to fly for a Part 91 Charter operation or a Part 135 operation in the future. 
Guillaume Le Couteulx was an exchange student fkom France studying at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University for one 
semester and graduated fkom the Ecole Nationale de 1'Aviation Civile in September 2007. 
Jitesh Bahl is currently a junior at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University. He is working on his Commercial Pilot Certificate 
and hopes to fly for All Nippon Airways (ANA) in Japan after graduation. 
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Appendix A 
Avion Article 
We Need to Change Our Mindset 
By: Ed Randel, Guillaume Le Couteulx, 
and Jitesh Bahl 
As many of you know there has been an abrupt increase in landing incidents here at ERAU. It is very easy to blame the 
pilots involved so that we can put distance between ourselves and the incidents. The fact is, however, this can happen to any one 
of us if we aren't careful. 
The purpose of this article is not to teach you how to land or set up an approach, instead it will hopellly help you 
recognize an unstable approach and make you aware of the importance of going around immediately. It also bears mentioning 
that every accident is the result of a chain of errors. Human errors are common in any endeavor and sometimes are so small that 
they are seen as being insignificant. Other times, several of the seemingly insignificant errors occur simultaneously, stacking up 
on each other and producing an accident. 
After talking with David Zwegers, Director of Aviation Safety here at ERAU, it was clear that all of the incidents were 
set up by an unstable approach. The flight department has taken steps to attempt to help avoid future incidents like the ones we 
have recently experienced. An all LP. meeting was called to review the importance of teaching a safe and stabilized landing 
approach to their students. Despite this, it is important to remember that all students must accept the responsibility of ensuring 
a safe flight. 
It is very easy to fall into the trap of trying to salvage an unstable approach during training because the instructor is there 
to tell us to go around if it gets too "bad". This can lead to a pilot who will only go around at the last second or when the words 
"go around'' are heard. Below are some tips to help you recognize an unstable approach. 
It is recommended by the FAA Safety Foundation that an approach in visual meteorological condition (VMC) be 
stabilized by at least 500 feet AGL. A stabilized approach should include these following conditions: 1) the aircraft is on the 
correct flight path, 2) only minor adjustments in heading, pitch, and power are needed to maintain that flight path, 3) your airspeed 
is stabilized at approach speed +5/-0 knots, 4) the aircraft is in landing con£iguration, 5 )  the sink (descent) rate is stabilized at no 
more than 500 feethin, and 6) all briefings and checklists are complete. These can be summarized by saying that the aircraft 
track, flight path angle, and the airspeed must all be in accordance with normal operating procedures. If any one of these are not 
met, an immediate go around should be executed. 
Some very common situations that occur on unstable approaches include: flying the approach at idle because of excess 
speed or altitude, increasing power on short final to stretch the approach, or very steep approaches requiring a side slip well below 
a safe stabilization altitude. 
Every,day pilots ignore these signs hoping to salvage a landing and avoid the go around. Most of the time the pilot is 
able to salvage the approach and safely land the airplane, but you cannot allow this normalization of deviance to occur. The h t  
time it happens you may only be 50 feet high, but after doing that a few times, 50 feet high becomes the standard approach height. 
One example of an attempt to salvage an unstable approach happened just last month in Pensacola, a. A student pilot, 
on his first solo, after one hour of landing practice with his instructor and one successful solo landing, impacted the trees at the 
departure end of the runway on his second solo landing attempt. The student was high on the approach and tried to salvage the 
approach. When the go around was initiated, it was too late. The pilot could not climb sufficiently, resulting in impacting the 
trees, but, luckily, damaging only the aircraft. 
An accident such as this, as well as the recent incidents here at ERAU, must lead to a change in mindset among all pilots. 
The attitude must change fiom "we will land unless.. ." to a mindset of "let's be prepared to go around, and only land if the 
approach is stabilized and we can continue safely to the runway". This change in attitude will not only lead to a decrease in the 
number of incidents, but will also improve the quality of landings by all levels of pilots. Thank you for taking the time to read 
this article and please continue to fly safely in the future. 
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